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ABSTRACT
The article summarises the findings obtained in the estimation of an economic crisis early warning 
model for the euro area countries. These findings show that monitoring five variables that may 
indicate the emergence of macro-financial imbalances – current account balance, unit labour 
costs relative to the rest of the euro area, household indebtedness, corporate indebtedness and 
sovereign risk premium – helps facilitate the early detection of downturns in the euro area 
countries. As expected, the model points to a widespread euro area-wide increase in the 
probability of a decline in activity towards the middle of the last decade, just before the start of 
the Great Recession. Compared with the core euro area economies, the increase in crisis 
probability was much more pronounced in the periphery countries, driven by a worsening of the 
current account balance, growing private sector indebtedness and deteriorating competitiveness. 
In several of these economies, the probability of downturn predicted by the model heightened in 
2011-2012, coinciding with the successive sovereign debt crisis episodes. Since then the 
probabilities of downturn have moderated substantially and are now low in most countries, albeit 
in some cases still above those observed at the turn of the century.
Keywords: early warning indicators, vulnerabilities, economic crisis forecasting.
JEL classification: C25, C33, E44, E58, G01.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 1 ECONOMIC BULLETIN  A CRISIS EARLY WARNING MODEL FOR EURO AREA COUNTRIES
The authors of this article are Jose González Mínguez and Carmen Martínez 
Carrascal of the Directorate General Economics, Statistics and Research. 
Introduction
The uneven severity of the Great Recession across economies highlighted the need 
to gain a better understanding of which are the factors that determine the degree of 
vulnerability of each country to a hypothetical shock. This need is even more pressing 
in the context of the euro area, owing to the existing institutional framework, which 
is characterised by the absence of national sovereignty over monetary policy and 
the lack of fiscal policy response mechanisms. As the last upturn showed, in the face 
of asymmetric shocks this may be conducive to the emergence of macro-financial 
imbalances and may hinder their subsequent correction, since it limits the room for 
manoeuvre of economic policies. As a result, the global financial crisis of 2007-2008 
was exacerbated in the euro area by the subsequent sovereign debt crisis of 2011-
2012 and the impact of the downturn was especially acute in the euro area economies 
that had built up most imbalances.
In any event, both within and beyond the euro area, a high level of consensus has been 
reached on the importance of the role played by the build-up of macro-financial 
imbalances as a determinant of the cross-country heterogeneity of the effects of a 
common shock such as that triggered by the Great Recession. It is, therefore, no surprise 
that there has been a proliferation of attempts to develop crisis early warning mechanisms, 
especially among the multilateral institutions that perform regular monitoring of countries’ 
economic situation. The main difficulty in this type of modelling is to detect the variables 
that may potentially signal the emergence of imbalances and also the levels of these 
variables that may determine that future downturns are developing.
Thus, in the European ambit, in 2011 the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure 
(MIP) was introduced. The starting point of this oversight mechanism is the Alert 
mechanism report drawn up annually by the European Commission, which assesses 
the existence and severity of imbalances that are potentially harmful for 
macroeconomic stability. This preventive analysis draws on a scoreboard of 
14 indicators – relating to the external position of the economy, private sector debt, 
house prices, the financial system and the labour market – that may be expected to 
capture the main aspects of existing vulnerabilities. For each variable thresholds are 
set which, if crossed, denote the presence of risks. 
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Similarly, the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) performs quarterly monitoring 
of a set of quantitative and qualitative indicators (included in the ESRB Risk 
Dashboard) to detect any build-up of risk for the financial system. Finally, as the last 
example, the OECD has proposed a set of more than 70 vulnerability indicators to 
help detect risks of future crises.1
In addition, various studies have attempted to assess how effectively these lists of 
indicators achieve the purpose for which they were designed, namely to provide 
sufficient early warning of an approaching crisis. Thus, for example, Kamps et al. (2014) 
conclude that had the MIP scoreboard indicators been in place before the start of the 
last downturn, they would have been able to give early warning of the imbalances that 
were responsible for its severity. The (highly simplistic) approach followed has been to 
count the number of indicators that crossed the thresholds set in each year analysed.2 
In other cases, assessing vulnerabilities is rather more complex. In general, the 
literature uses two empirical proxies:
— In the first, identifying the thresholds (for each of the key crisis prediction 
indicators) which, if crossed, signal high crisis probability, is crucial. The 
choice of these thresholds rests on an ad hoc decision as to which type of 
error is preferred: the model used fails to emit a crisis signal and yet a 
crisis ensues (type I error); or the model predicts a crisis that fails to 
materialise (type II error).3 According to this methodology, the OECD finds 
that a subset of the more than 70 indicators mentioned above would have 
predicted past downturns.4 The IMF obtains similar findings from early 
warning models that distinguish between different types of crises and 
between advanced and emerging market economies.5
— The second proxy uses a multivariate logistic regression model to 
estimate the probability of downturn.6 This type of model may be used 
1  See Röhn, Caldera Sánchez, Hermansen and Rasmussen (2015).
2   Thus, for example, in the case of Spain, five of the fourteen scoreboard indicators would have crossed the 
thresholds set in 2003, six in 2004 and seven between 2005 and 2007. 
3   This method – the signalling approach – was originally used for early detection of signals of currency or 
balance of payment crises in emerging market economies (see, for example, Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) 
and Frankel and Rose (1996)). Since the Great Recession, efforts have been geared more towards detecting 
risks in developed economies.
4   See Hermansen and Röhn (2017). Global risk indicators, such as deviation from their respective trends of 
global  credit  (as  a  proportion  of GDP)  or  of  a  global  house  price  or  stock market  index,  stand  out  in 
particular for their predictive power.
5   See Basu, Chamon and Crowe (2017) who argue that fiscal, balance of payment and “economic” crises 
(the latter identified as declines in GDP) may each respond to different causes, thus justifying the design of 
specific early warning tools for each type of crisis.
6   See Martín Machuca (2017) for an analysis of the determinants of balance of payment crisis episodes in 
euro area economies.
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to predict variables that may take a limited number of values (in the case 
described here, just two, that is, whether or not the downturn materialises) 
as a function of various independent variables. This is the methodology 
used here and it has the advantage of permitting statistical contrast 
analysis of the significance of the indicators.
Specifically, after this introduction, the second section of the article describes the 
model estimated for early identification of economic crises in the euro area countries 
and sets out the results obtained. In the third section, these findings are used to 
analyse which factors have had the most impact, according to the model used, in 
explaining the crises recorded in the sample period available. 
Estimation of a multivariate logistic regression model for early identification 
of economic crises for the euro area countries
The model, estimated for the whole of the euro area drawing on annual country-
level data, predicts the probability of a decline in activity (measured by real GDP) in 
a specific year. Data for the period between 1990 and 2018 are used for the 
estimation, for each of the 19 euro area countries. Where complete data are not 
available, the sample is limited to the time period that is available. This is the case 
of the countries that joined the euro area most recently (in the middle of the last 
decade), for which the necessary data for the analysis are only available for the 
years 2005-2018.
The probability of a contraction in GDP, obtained using a logistic regression model, 
is linked to economic and financial indicators that, in accordance with the economic 
literature, may reflect a build-up of vulnerabilities which, in the face of a specific 
shock, may result in a downturn. In any event, the subset of indicators finally included 
in the model is selected from among those described above according to their 
empirical capacity to explain the probability of a decline in GDP. Specifically, there 
are five indicators in the final specification that capture imbalances in the financial 
position of the private sector and in public finances and vis-à-vis the rest of the 
world. All these variables are lagged by one period.
Regarding external imbalances, the model contains two variables: current account 
balance as a proportion of GDP (specifically, the average in the three years 
previous to the year considered) and the change in the unit labour costs (ULCs) of 
the country considered compared with those of its euro area competitors (in 
terms of the cumulative change in the same period). Persistent external trade 
deficits will increase a country’s external debt, which heightens its vulnerability in 
face of possible shifts in investor sentiment. This effect is exacerbated in the case 
of an economy that belongs to a monetary union, as it is unable to use the 
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exchange rate as an adjustment mechanism. In consequence, the adjustment 
must be based on either productivity growth or internal devaluation, or in other 
words on price and wage growth below the levels recorded in the monetary union 
overall. However, an external deficit is not always a sign of loss of competitiveness; 
in some cases it may simply reflect optimum allocation of resources when 
presented with more favourable investment opportunities. The inclusion in the 
model of relative ULCs is precisely geared to detecting the more benign causes 
of an external deficit.
Imbalances in the private sector’s financial position are a source of vulnerability 
insofar as rapid growth in households’ and non-financial corporations’ indebtedness 
often leads to banking crises.7 Growing credit to private agents makes for a higher 
interest burden that may prove difficult to bear in the event of negative income 
shocks. For this reason, the model includes the household debt ratio (as a 
percentage of households’ disposable income) and the change in the corporate 
debt ratio (as a proportion of GDP). The last variable included in the model is the 
10-year government bond yield spread of the country analysed over the German 
equivalent. This variable reflects the cost of borrowing for both private and public 
agents and may also indicate the risk of general government default perceived by 
the markets. The euro area sovereign debt crisis highlighted the harmful connection 
between a country’s public finances and its banking system. The connection implied 
that governments might have to issue debt to recapitalise the banks under their 
jurisdiction; in turn, the higher sovereign risk resulting from the increase in 
government debt could generate portfolio losses for banks and hamper their 
wholesale funding. 
Table 1 presents the findings obtained from an estimation of the model described. 
The second column shows the coefficients estimated for each of the explanatory 
variables. As expected, these indicate that an increase in an economy’s ULCs relative 
to those of the rest of the euro area raises the probability of a decline in its GDP 
(owing to the loss of competitiveness it entails). A wider spread between a country’s 
government bond yield and the German equivalent (which for a given German bond 
yield entails higher borrowing costs for both the public and the private sector) also 
increases that probability. Likewise, higher household or corporate indebtedness 
raises the probability of downturn, as it reduces the room for manoeuvre that these 
agents have to address unexpected adverse events. The opposite is true in the case 
of a build-up of external surpluses, since they favour a decline in the debt assumed 
with the rest of the world and thus translate into greater economic strength.
As logistic regression models are not linear, the coefficients obtained do not directly 
reflect the scale of the marginal impact of changes in each of the explanatory 
7   See, for example, Borio and Lowe (2002).
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variables on crisis probability (although they do reflect the sign of the impact). In this 
model, the size of the impact will depend both on the level of the variable that records 
the increase and the level of all the other variables. For example, the impact on crisis 
probability of an increase in relative ULCs will depend on the level of the ULCs and 
also on the level of all the other variables entered into the specification. For purposes 
of illustration, the third column of Table  1 shows the marginal impact on crisis 
probability of each of the explanatory variables when they are all at their average 
level. When this marginal impact is assessed on average for all the countries in the 
sample, a deterioration in the current account balance of 1 pp of GDP in the average 
of the three years previous to the year considered drives up the probability of a 
contraction in activity by 1.7 pp.
Chart 1 shows the probability of decline in GDP given by the model for each country 
in the years for which there are data available. As the chart shows, this probability 
follows an upward path in most euro area countries between the middle of the last 
decade and 2013, albeit starting from generally low levels.8 Among the core euro 
DETERMINANTS OF PROBABILITY OF DOWNTURN IN THE EURO AREA. FINDINGS OF A LOGISTIC MODEL (a)
Table 1
SOURCE: Own calculations.
a The model is estimated drawing on annual country-level data for the euro area Member States and includes fixed country-level effects.
b Average for the last three years. Lagged by one period.
c Cumulative change in the last three years. Lagged by one period.
d Household debt-to-GDI ratio. Lagged by one period.
e Corporate debt-to-GDP ratio. Lagged by one period.
f Spread between a country’s government bond yield and the German equivalent. Lagged by one period.
g ***, ** denote statistical significance at 1% and 5%, respectively.
h For the subset of countries made up of Cyprus, Greece, Spain, Ireland, Italy and Portugal.
Average
level
slevel 8102slevel 1102slevel 7002slevel 0002
)g(.ffeoCselbairav yrotanalpxE
    Current account balance (b) -0.25 *** -1.7 -1.8 -2.3 -3.1 -4.2 -1.8
    Change in relative ULCs (c) 0.11 *** 0.7 0.7 0.9 1.3 1.8 0.7
    Household indebtedness (d) 0.04 *** 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.7 0.3
    Growth in corporate indebtedness (e) 0.07 ** 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.8 1.1 0.5
    Government bond yield spread (f) 0.51 *** 3.3 3.6 4.6 6.1 8.5 3.6
Estimation period
Number of observations
Adjusted R²
Estimated
coefficients
349
34.3%
Marginal impacts (in pp) of changes in
explanatory variables when at their:
1990-2018
2011 levels (h)
8   The model also signals very high probabilities of downturn at the start of the 1990s in Finland, which at that 
time was in the throes of a severe banking crisis. It predicts more moderate (albeit also high) probabilities 
of contraction in GDP for that period for Spain, despite the downturn in the Spanish economy at that time. 
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area countries, the probability of downturn in this period increased modestly in 
Germany, Belgium and France, but it rose more significantly in Spain, Greece, 
Ireland, Portugal and, to a lesser extent, Italy. In the first decade of the century, the 
growth in this probability in these countries was linked above all to a deterioration of 
the external balance, an increase in household indebtedness and, in some cases, to 
more marked relative increases in ULCs than in previous years. However, at the start 
of the current decade, the most significant factor in explaining this upward path was 
the growth in risk premia, especially in Greece and Portugal. In these years, the 
model identifies high probabilities of a decline in GDP in these countries, despite the 
external balance and ULC adjustments made during the first years of the crisis, 
owing to the persistently high levels of their risk premia. Since then the probabilities 
The increase in the probability of a decline in activity was more pronounced in the periphery than in the core euro area countries immediately 
before the Great Recession. In recent years this probability has decreased substantially.
ESTIMATED PROBABILITY OF ECONOMIC CRISIS FOR THE EURO AREA COUNTRIES, 1991-2019
Chart 1
SOURCE: Own calculations.
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of downturn have moderated substantially and were, on the data available up to 
2018, low in most countries.9
One way to assess the goodness of fit of these early warning models is to analyse 
the downturns observed in the euro area Member States during the period under 
study.10 In the case of the model estimated here, taking a threshold of 24% for the 
estimated probability of contraction in GDP, the model would correctly anticipate 
72% of the crises recorded in the sample and would have incorrectly alerted of a 
downturn in 14% of cases in which there was no subsequent decline in activity (type 
II statistical error).11 
Analysis of the impact of economic and financial variables on the 
probability of downturn 
As explained in the previous section, the impact of changes recorded in each of the 
explanatory variables on the probability of a contraction in GDP is not constant, but 
depends on the level of each variable (and all the other variables included in the 
specification). Thus, for example, if household indebtedness is low, an increase in 
household liabilities of 1% of their gross income would have a smaller impact on the 
probability of a contraction in GDP than if the increase were to arise against a 
backdrop of higher household indebtedness. In addition, depending on the starting 
point, if several imbalances were to build up simultaneously this may give rise to a 
more than proportional increase in the probability of a downturn compared with a 
hypothetical situation in which only one of those imbalances were to present 
deterioration.
Chart 2 illustrates how the probability of a decline in GDP predicted by the model 
varies according to the level of each of the explanatory variables. For example, 
 9   In 2019, numerous euro area economies have recorded a significant weakening in activity. The models 
that predict GDP growth according to a set of short-term monthly indicators have shown increases in the 
probability of downturn. This deteriorating outlook for activity in the short term has been determined by the 
gradual intensification of various sources of uncertainty affecting the global economy (such as the trade 
tensions between the United States and China and the Brexit process). Nevertheless, on the data available 
up to 2018, the model used in this article has not signalled an increase in the probability of downturn in 
2019. This is because in 2019 the above-mentioned factors of uncertainty have not had an appreciable 
effect on the variables that capture the risk of decline in GDP in the model.
10  As  indicated  in  the  introduction,  the proportion of  events  correctly  classified as downturn/absence of 
downturn  is  the criteria used  in  the design of models  in  the other  large  family of empirical proxies  for 
assessing the validity of early warning indicators.
11   The 24% threshold was chosen so as to foresee the bulk of the downturns recorded in the estimation 
period and, at the same time, minimise the type II error described in the introduction. If the threshold were 
reduced (raised), the model’s capacity to predict future crises would increase (decrease), but the proportion 
of incorrect alert signals (a recession is predicted but does not occur) would also increase (decrease). 
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The impact of changes in the determinants of crisis probability on that probability is uneven; the more adverse the starting point (i.e. a high 
current account deficit, high private sector indebtedness, higher ULC growth than among competitors, or a high risk premium), the greater 
the impact.
ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF CHANGES IN A COUNTRY’S ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL SITUATION ON CRISIS PROBABILITY
Chart 2
SOURCE: Own calculations drawing on the findings of the model presented in Table 1.
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Chart 2.1 presents the average probability of downturn according to the level of the 
external surplus (as a percentage of GDP), once all the other variables included in 
the model are set, for each year and each country, at their observed levels. As the 
chart shows, this probability declines as the current account balance improves. But 
the impact is uneven: the larger the current account deficit, the greater the impact. 
Thus, on average, an improvement in the external deficit from -8% to -6% of GDP 
reduces the risk of a decline in activity by 7.5 pp, whereas an increase in the surplus 
from 6% to 8% reduces it by just 1.6 pp.
Likewise, as Chart 2.2 shows, when ULCs record much more pronounced declines 
(in cumulative terms over three years) than in the euro area countries overall, the 
already low crisis probability is relatively little affected by a further decline in those 
relative costs. Conversely, the greater the loss of competitiveness suffered by the 
economy, the more marked the impact. In particular, when the change in relative 
ULCs is -10 pp, a further 5 pp reduction translates on average into a decline of 2 pp 
in the probability of downturn the following year, whereas when the change is 10 pp, 
an equivalent reduction of 5 pp in relative ULCs has an impact of 7  pp on that 
probability.
An increase in the sovereign debt spread over the German equivalent also has a very 
different impact on the average probability of downturn according to the starting 
point: the impact is much more pronounced when the spread is wider than when it 
is narrow (or negative). By contrast, the effect of changes in corporate indebtedness 
on the probability of a decline in GDP is relatively even and less pronounced than in 
the case of other variables.12 
Accordingly, the marginal effects of changes in the explanatory variables on the 
probability of a decline in GDP presented in the third column of Table 1, which have 
been assessed assuming that those variables are at their average level, may differ 
substantially from those recorded under alternative scenarios. For instance, these 
impacts may be much more pronounced if assessed in the wake of a prolonged 
build-up of substantial macroeconomic or financial imbalances. For purposes of 
illustration, the right-hand columns of Table  1 present the marginal impact that 
changes in the explanatory variables have on the average probabilities of a decline 
in GDP when those variables are at their 2000, 2007, 2011 and 2018 levels. As the 
table shows, those marginal impacts were higher in 2007, following the build-up of 
imbalances observed in many euro area countries during the upturn that preceded 
the crisis, than at the start of the decade. The estimated impacts were also higher in 
2011, even though by then there had been a significant correction in many countries 
12   It  should  be  noted  that  as  this  variable  is  inputted  into  the  model  as  differences  rather  than  levels, 
comparison with,  for example,  the findings presented  in Chart 2.3 on  the household debt  ratio  is not 
straightforward.
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of the macroeconomic vulnerabilities built up in previous years. The reason for this 
is the considerable rise in many countries’ risk premia, against the backdrop of the 
sovereign debt crisis. This explains why the 2011 marginal impacts are even higher 
when calculated for the group of countries most affected by that crisis (see the 
seventh column of Table 1).13 In 2018, once debt market tensions had been corrected 
and the macroeconomic imbalances built up in previous years had shrunk, the 
marginal effects would be close to those of the early years of the century.
25.11.2019.
13   Namely Cyprus, Greece, Spain, Ireland, Italy and Portugal.
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